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1. Introduction  
Present consumption influences the utility of future consumption in two important ways. 
First, it creates satiation, thereby reducing the satisfaction derived from future consumption 
in the near future. A rich meal for dinner seems less attractive after a heavy lunch. A trip to 
Hawaii may seem less attractive if one had traveled to Hawaii the previous year. Satiation 
wanes with the passage of time and has a half-life that depends on the nature of the good 
consumed. Second, present consumption contributes to habit formation and, therefore, 
increases future marginal utility. Classical music, outdoor activities and sports, sushi, and 
drugs are a few examples of habit-forming goods. 
In discounted utility (DU) models, consumption independence is assumed whereby the 
utility of consumption in each period is computed afresh and is independent of past 
consumption. Baucells and Sarin (2006) present a modification of the DU Model that 
accounts for satiation (SA Model). Becker (1966); Pollak (1970), Ryder and Heal (1973), 
Wathieu (1997, 2004) propose models that modify the DU Model to account for habituation 
(HA Model). 
Read, Lowenstein, and Rabin (1999) state that “The most important taste change effects are 
habit formation and satiation.'' In this paper, we propose a Habituation-Satiation (HS) Model 
that combines both habituation and satiation in the evaluation of consumption streams. In 
the HS Model, habituation is influenced by a parameter, α, and satiation by a parameter, γ. 
The evaluation of a consumption stream and, hence, the optimal consumption plan, depends 
on the relative values of α and γ; when γ → 0, the optimal consumption plan resembles that 
obtained using a habit formation model. Similarly, when α → 0, the optimal plan resembles 
that obtained using a satiation model. When both parameters tend to zero, then we converge 
towards a DU model. 
In Section 2, we introduce the HS Model. In this model, the carrier of utility is the difference 
between consumption (x) and a habituation level or reference point (r). When x = r, a neutral 
utility level of zero is achieved. Consumption in excess of r induces positive experienced 
utility, but also contributes to the satiation level (y). In contrast, consumption below r 
produces a negative experienced utility and contributes to the reduction of y, and may produce 
craving, or a negative satiation level.  
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The satiation level (y) is an exponentially discounted sum of excess past consumption over 
the reference point. Similarly, the habituation level (r) is a weighted average (exponential 
smoothing) of past consumption. The experienced utility is v(x – r + y) – v(y). Here, v can 
be thought of as concave utility or an S-shaped value function as in prospect theory. In this 
paper, we take v to be the prospect theory value function in which zero is interpreted as a 
neutral state of neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction. The overall utility is simply the 
discounted sum of experienced utilities in each period. 
Habituation has been studied in economics for several decades. Satiation has been a 
cornerstone of economic analysis and is captured through diminishing marginal utility in 
a  static analysis. Our combined habituation-satiation model permits predictions that are 
difficult to make through either model alone. Section 3 explores some properties of the HS 
Model. We show that the model satisfies the local substitution property and, therefore, a 
consumption of (1,1) or (2,0) would yield the same utility if the time interval between two 
periods is made small. This property simply says that a slice of cake now and another slice a 
few seconds later should yield about the same utility as two slices of cake now. The HA 
Model and the DU Model do not satisfy this property. 
In Section 4, we examine the willingness to pay for a unit of consumption under various 
levels of state variables r and y. In a constant consumption case, we illustrate that the 
willingness to pay in the HS Model follows a richer pattern than what is possible in the DU, 
HA, or SA models. 
In Section 5, we present the optimal consumption plan produced by the HS Model. In the 
pure habituation case (α = 0, γ = 0), the optimal consumption plan is increasing. In the pure 
satiation case (α = 0, γ > 0), the optimal plan has a U-shaped form (high consumption at the 
beginning and at the end and a smooth consumption path in the middle). Under general 
conditions, an increasing plan also emerges as optimal in the combined model. 
In Section 6, we show that under projection bias (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
2003), the predicted utility of current Consumption over time is lower than the actual 
realized utility. Projection bias leads an individual to believe that the future will be similar 
to the present (current r and y will change more slowly than they actually do). An increase 
in consumption does provide higher utility initially but one becomes accustomed to ''the 
good life'' and realizes less experienced utility than one had hoped for initially. On the flip 
side, Adam Smith's man with the wooden leg (Smith, 1759, Part III, Ch. 3) does not feel as 
miserable over time as one would predict at the beginning. Projection bias may also cause a 
prisoner to believe that incarceration was not as bad as he had anticipated. One implication 
of projection bias is that people buy more when they are hungry or consider a turkey meal 
for Christmas less appetizing after a Thanksgiving turkey dinner because they project their 
current satiation levels into the future. 
In Section 7, we examine the optimal consumption pattern that maximizes peak utility. We 
show that craving is induced by abstaining from consumption which creates an unmet need 
(γ = 0). Consumption then satisfies the need by creating a peak utility experience, as utility 
is obtained by using the steeper segment of the value function in the negative domain. 
This is observed when one enjoys lunch when hungry or a shower after a long hike. The 
phenomenon of craving is specific to the HS Model and cannot be captured by either the HS 
or the SA models. 
In Section 8, we consider a discrete choice problem where in each period only one of the 
two goods can be consumed. We show that the optimal choice pattern provides both variety- 
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seeking and habituation. Of course, optimal planning can only be done if the effects of 
habituation and satiation are fully accounted for by the consumer. 
While studying optimal planning under such a high level of sophistication is interesting, the 
more important insights from our model are obtained when certain biases prevent economic 
agents from properly accounting for the effects of current consumption on future utility. 
One such bias is narrow choice bracketing, recently discussed in Read, Loewenstein and 
Rabin (1999). Herrnstein and Prelec (1992) argue that people ignore negative internalities of 
current consumption on future utilities and thus make suboptimal choices. We show in 
Section 9 that under narrow choice bracketing, when each period decision is made 
independently, we obtain substantially inferior results. A varied choice, though locally less 
preferred, (e.g., vacation to a different destination, trying a new restaurant, extending the 
friendship circle), may maximize total experienced utility in the broad bracket evaluation. 
In Section 10, we consider the discrete choice problem that allows for variable quantity. The 
optimal plan consists of an increasing consumption over time that alternates between two 
goods. 
We agree with Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) that satiation and habituation are 
important determinants of utility. Current consumption causes satiation in the short run and 
habituation in the long run, and through these factors impacts the experienced utility of 
future consumption. Useful insights into a wide range of human behavior such as craving, 
variety-seeking, and addiction can be obtained through our model. A rational person will 
simply anticipate satiation and habituation and, therefore, make optimal choices for lifetime 
consumption as well as for an idiosyncratic discrete choice situation. Narrow bracketing and 
projection bias, however, cause individuals to make sub-optimal choices with systematic 
and predictable results. We conclude in Section 11 with the implications of our analysis for 
consumer choice and rational decision-making. 
2. A Combined Model of Habituation and Satiation 
Let (x1, x2,…, xT) be a consumption stream. What is the total utility that a consumer obtains 
from such a stream? The Discounted Utility (DU) Model proposes that the total utility be 








1 δ v(xt) 
where v(xt) is the utility of consumption xt in period t, and δ
t is the discount factor associated 
with period t. 
The DU Model was first proposed by Samuelson (1937) and subsequently axiomatized by 
Koopmans (1960) and Koopmans, Diamond and Williamson (1964) for countable infinite 
streams. The discount factor incorporates impatience, which is balanced by the desire to 
spread out consumption induced by the concavity of v. A key feature of the DU Model is the 
separability over time. Thus, the utility derived from present consumption is not affected by 
past consumption. Hence, it does not account for habituation or satiation. 
Many goods are habit-forming, where present consumption increases the marginal utility of 
future consumption. People get accustomed to eating in higher-priced restaurants or staying 
in better-quality hotels as their income increases. This adaptation does not happen instantly, 
but over time their reference point relative to which utility is evaluated moves upward.  
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Several modifications of the DU Model have been proposed to incorporate the habituation 
phenomenon. Of these modifications, we adopt Wathieu (1997, 2004). Wathieu's model 
captures the key aspect of habituation (i.e., consumption today increases the marginal utility 
of future consumption) by introducing a reference point. Wathieu's finite-time model 
successfully explains the preference for increasing consumption paths. Reference points, 
denoted as habituation levels, are psychologically sound (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Rabin, 1998). In a reference-point model, zero utility can be interpreted as a neutral state of 
neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction, and positive utility is obtained when the consumption 
level exceeds the habituation level. Specifically, Wathieu's habituation model (HA) would 
evaluate (x1, x2,…, xT) as follows:  







1 δ  v(xt − rt), 
 r t+1 = αxt + (1 − α) rt, t = 1,…, T − 1, r1  given 
Here, α ∈ [0, 1] is the habituation factor, and rt is the corresponding habituation level. 
When α = 0, the HA Model reduces to the DU Model. When α = 1, the reference point in 
the current period is simply the consumption in the last period. The habituation factor, α, 
could be different for different goods. In a life-cycle consumption model, we assume a level 
of α that reflects adaptation to the aggregate level of consumption in each period. 
Besides habituation, a second important way in which consumption today affects future 
preferences is satiation. Baucells and Sarin (2006) introduce a satiation model in which the 
contribution of current consumption to experienced utility is through the satiation level 
achieved due to previous consumption. Thus, the carrier of utility is the increment from 
current satiation rather than current consumption. Suppose that the satiation level is y at the 
beginning of a period. A consumption x in this period yields a utility v(y + x) – v(y) rather 
than v(x). Clearly, when y = 0 and assuming v(0) = 0, the experienced utility is simply v(x). 
In this case, our model coincides with the DU Model, as the utility is computed afresh each 
period. Further, when x = 0, the experienced utility is also zero. 
The total utility of (x1, x2,…, xT) in the Satiation Model is:  







1 δ  [v(yt + xt) – v(yt)], 
 y t+1 = γ(yt + xt), t = 1, ..., T – 1, y1 given 
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the satiation retention factor, and yt is the corresponding satiation level 
produced by previous consumption. It is easily seen that the satiation level is the cumulative 







s t x γ +  γ
t–1y1. For some 
consumptions (e.g., a tennis lesson), utility is derived over an extended period of time. Such 
goods should be modeled as durable goods with a consumption flow over time. 
In the tennis lesson example, the utility of the first lesson is u(x1). If η is the learning decay 
factor, then the actual consumption in period 2 is ηx1 + x2. In the DU Model, the total utility 
of (x1, x2) is: 
UDU (x1, x2) = u(x1) + δu(ηx1 + x2) 
Thus, the sooner one takes the second tennis lesson, the higher the total utility will be 
because both δ and η decay with time. We now apply the Satiation Model, keeping in mind 
that the actual consumption in period 2 is ηx1 + x2. Hence, 
USA(x1, x2) = u(x1) + δ[u(γx1 +ηx1 + x2) – u(γx1)]  
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Interestingly, the SA Model shows a tradeoff between bringing forward the second tennis 
lesson to profit from the learning achieved in the first lesson, and allowing some time to rest 
from the first lesson (satiation). This tension is realistic and would yield an optimal timing 
between lessons. 
Figure 1 



















Our next goal is to present a hybrid model, called the HS Model, for habituation 
and satiation. The combined model (Figure 1) is strongly reference-dependent: the carrier 
of utility is consumption in excess of the habituation level and the driver of satiation is also 
consumption in excess of the habituation level, rt. In the HS Model, the utility of a neutral 
outcome (x = r) is zero. This is consistent with the Experienced Utility Model and the 
Prospect Theory Model (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin, 1997). Formally,  







1 δ  [v(yt + xt – rt) – v(yt)],   (1) 
  rt+1 = αxt + (1 – α)rt, t = 1, …, T – 1, r1 given, and   (2) 
  yt+1 = γ(yt + xt – rt), t = 1, …, T – 1, y1 given.  (3) 
 
The combined model particularizes to the HA Model if γ = 0, to the SA Model if α = 0, and 
to the DU Model if both γ and α are zero. We will show that the HS Model explains some 
phenomena that cannot be explained by either the HA or the SA models alone. We 
recognize that, in some cases, either habituation or satiation is the main factor and that the 
full force of the HS Model may not be needed. The virtue of the combined model is that it 
enables the data to reveal the appropriate levels of the habituation and satiation parameters.  
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3. Properties of the Combined HS Model 
A simple way to compare the experienced utility of the four model combinations is to 
consider a two-period problem. We fix consumption in the first period at x1 equal to one 
unit. If the initial satiation and habituation levels are zero, then the experienced utility in 
period 1 for all models is v(1), and the habituation and satiation levels for period 2 coincide 
with α and γ, respectively. We now consider the experienced utility in period 2 derived from 
consuming x2 = 0, 1, or 2 units. We assume that α = γ = 0.5. Table 1 shows how the four 
different models yield different predictions. 
Consider the consumption profile (x1 = 1, x2 = 1). As shown in the middle column of Table 1, 
the experienced utility in period 2 is the highest for the DU Model, as the utility is computed 
afresh. 
Table 1 
Experienced Utility in Period 2 for Different Consumption Levels, Starting with r₁= y₁= 0, 
and after Having Consumed One Unit in Period 1. [α = γ = 0.5] 
    v(y₂+ x₂– r₂) – v(y₂) 
Model  r₂[= α]  y₂[= γ]  x₂ = 0  x₂ = 1  x₂ = 2 
DU 0  0  v(0) = 0  v(1)  v(2) 
HA 0.5  0  v(–0.5)  v(0.5)  v(1.5) 
SA 0 0.5  v(0.5) – v(0.5) = 0  v(1.5) – v(0.5)  v(2.5) – v(0.5) 
HS 0.5 0.5  v(0) – v(0.5)  v(1) – v(0.5)  v(2) – v(0.5) 
 
Figure 2 
Direct and Indirect Effect of Consumption on Future Levels of Habituation and Satiation 
 
 
In both the HA and the SA models, the experienced utility in period 2 is lower than that implied 
by the DU Model. This is because the higher reference point in the HA Model, r2 = 0.5, and the 
higher satiation level in the SA Model, y2 = 0.5, reduce utility. The utility in the HS Model is 
lower than in the SA Model. We now explore more formally the effects of current consumption 
on future habituation and satiation levels.  
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3.1. The Effects of Current Consumption 
To examine the effect that xs has on utility in time t, t > s, we consider the effects that xs has 
on future habituation and satiation levels. In Figure 2, one can visualize the dynamic effects 
of equations (2) and (3). According to these equations, both the satiation level and the 
habituation level are weighted sums of past consumption. The coefficient that x1 has in 
the expression for y3, for instance, is the sum of the coefficients across all directed paths that 
connect x1 with y3; and the coefficient of a given path is the product of coefficients along 
this path. Thus, x1 appears in the expression for y3 multiplied by γ
2 – αγ. 
Proposition 1 Both rt and yt are linear functions of xs, s = 1, …, t – 1. If t > s, then the 
coefficient of xs in rt and yt , respectively, is given by: 
  ∂rt /∂xs = α(1 – α)
t-s-1,   (4) 
  ∂yt /∂xs = [γ(1 – γ)γ
 t-s-1 – γα(1 – α)
 t-s-1]/(1 – α – γ) if α + γ ≠ 1, and   (5) 
  ∂yt /∂xs = γ
 t-s-1(γ – (1– γ)(t–s–1)) otherwise.   (6) 
 
Proof. Inspection of Figure 2 shows that x1 increases r2 in αx1, increases r3 in α(1– α)x1, 
increases  r4  in  α(1–  α)
2x1, etc., and (4) follows. Regarding equation (5), notice that xs 
increases ys+1 in yxs. The effect of xs on ys+2 is a combination of a direct effect (γ
2) and an 
indirect effect (–αγ) due to the mitigation effect that habituation has on satiation. The final 
effect of xs on yt, t > s, is given by: 
 
  ∂yt/∂xs =  γ
 t–s – αγ
 t–(s+1) – α(1– α)γ
 t–(s+1) –1… – α(1– α)γ
 t–s–2γ 
   =  γ














   = 
γ α
α γα γ γ γ
− −
− − −
− − − −
1
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 1 s t s t
 
 
One can distinguish three effects of current consumption, xs, on future utility. First, current 
consumption increases the future habituation level, as given by (4). The higher habituation 
levels produced by the first effect always reduce future experienced utility, but increase the 
marginal utility of future consumption. Second, current consumption increases the future 
satiation level via the positive coefficient γ
t-s(1–γ)
 in (5). Third, the interaction between 
satiation and habituation lowers future satiation via the negative coefficient γα(1– α)
 t–s–1 
in (5). The net result of these two effects is always positive and equal to γ in the subsequent 
period (t = s + 1); however, if α > 0, then ∂yt /∂xs eventually becomes negative as t – s 
grows larger. In fact, if α > γ and t ≥ s + 2, then ∂yt /∂xs < 0. This interaction effect, which 
may produce ∂yt /∂xs < 0, shows that habituation mitigates satiation. Because satiation is 
driven by consumption in excess of the habituation level, current consumption increases the 
future habituation level, which has the indirect effect of reducing the satiation level two or 
more periods ahead. Hence, current consumption increases satiation level in the next (and 
possibly some subsequent) period(s), but reduces the satiation level of the remaining 
periods. For those periods where ∂yt /∂xs > 0, if v is concave, then the marginal utility of xt 
unambiguously increases with xs. 
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The fact that habituation mitigates satiation implies that, once habituated, a consumer is able 
to sustain large intakes without experiencing satiation. For instance, somebody used to 
classical music may listen to classical music for the entire day without experiencing 
satiation. On the contrary, a consumer just initiated to some consumption good for which he 
has little habituation may be easily satiated with relatively small amounts. 
We expect α and γ to depend on the time interval between periods. For satiation, as the time 
separation between periods increases, one expects larger decays in satiation levels. Hence, γ 
tends to 0 as the separation between time intervals increases (and to 1 if it decreases). With 
respect to the habituation level, one expects α to increase (higher adaptation speed) over 
longer time intervals. Conversely, if the time interval shrinks, then we expect α to tend to 0. In 
general, satiation is more pronounced for shorter time intervals and habituation occurs over 
longer time periods. Over time, one may adapt to higher-priced or quality restaurants, but, in 
short periods (e.g., daily), one may seek variety in the type of food consumed because of 
satiation. However, even for a large fixed time interval, there are goods for which γ could be 
large (e.g., movies, vacations), as well as goods for which α could be small. 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam (Smith, 1776, p. 183) argues that “the desire of food is 
limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach, but desire of the 
conveniences and ornaments of buildings, dress, equipage, and household furniture, seems 
to have no limit or certain boundary.'' Food, shelter, clothing, sleep, and social relationships 
are goods for which α is small; hence we call them basic goods. If the reference level stays 
relatively constant, then the evaluation of these goods is given by the SA Model. We expect 
that basic goods will produce satiation depending on the absolute intake value. As there is 
little habituation, basic goods produce high levels of experienced utility across their 
lifetime, assuming the satiation level is kept under control. Goods with a high α are 
habituating goods, and the quantities one can consume of these goods can be quite large. 
The reference point for such goods, however, adapts to the level of consumption and the 
experienced utility reverts to the neutral level. 
3.2. The Local Substitution Property 
An important motivation for the form that we chose for the HS Model is the local substitution 
property. The property is compelling: consumption in the two-period stream (2, 0) should 
yield the same utility as the stream (1, 1) as the time separation between period 1 and 2 
approaches zero. As argued in Baucells and Sarin (2006), neither the DU nor the HA models 
possess the local substitution property. This property says that eating two slices of cake now 
and no slices of cake a few seconds later should be equivalent to eating one slice of cake 
now and one slice of cake a few seconds later.  
Let ∆ be the length of the time interval between periods. We now argue that if ∆ → 0, then 
UHS(x1, x2) and UHS(x1 + x2, 0) both tend to v(x1 + x2). 
Proposition 2 If γ > 0, then UHS(x1, x2) → UHS(x1 + x2, 0) as ∆ → 0.  
Proof of Proposition 2. First, notice that as ∆ goes to zero, one should expect α(∆) to go to zero, 
and γ (∆) to go to one, provided γ > 0. One natural way to keep the satiation half-life and the speed 
of adaptation approximately constant would be to set γ (∆) = γ
∆ and α(∆) = 1 – (1 – α)
∆. We now 
show that both UHS(x1, x2) and UHS(x1 + x2, 0) tend to v(x1 + x2 – 2r1 + y1) – v(y1).  
  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 9 
  UHS(x1, x2) =  v(x1 – r1 + y1) – v(y1) 
   +  v(x2 – (αx1 + (1 – α) r1) + γ (x1 – r1 + y1)) – v(γ(x1 – r1 + y1)) 
   →  v(x1 – r1 + y1) – v(y1) + v(x2 + x1 – 2r1+ y1) – v(x1 – r1 + y1) 
   =  v(x1 + x2 – 2r1+ y1) – v(y1), and 
 UHS(x1 + x2, 0) =  v(x1 + x2 – r1+ y1) – v(y1) 
   +  v(–(α(x1 + x2) + (1 – α)r1) + γ (x1 + x2 – r1 + y1)) – v(γ(x1 + x2 – r1 + y1)) 
   →  v(x1 + x2 – r1 + y1) – v(y1) + v(x1 + x2 – 2r1+ y1) – v(x1 + x2 – r1+ y1) 
   =  v(x1 + x2 – 2r1 + y1) – v(y1).   
 
A combined model in which satiation is driven by the absolute level of consumption, and not 
by consumption in excess of the habituation level, would not possess the local substitution 
property. 
4. Willingness to Pay 
In order to obtain a feel for how the model operates, we now consider how changes in the levels 
of satiation and habituation affect the willingness to pay for one unit of consumption. We define 
the willingness to pay (wtp) as the difference between the utility of consuming one unit and the 
utility of consuming zero units in a given period. Of course, willingness to pay depends on 
previous consumption via the current habituation and satiation levels y and r. Assuming a quasi-
linear utility for money, the willingness to pay for one unit of consumption is:  
  wtp = [v(y + 1– r) – v(y)] – [v(y – r) – v(y)] = v(1 + y – r) – v(y – r) (7) 
Inspection of equation (7) reveals that wtp depends on y – r. For a concave v, wtp always 
decreases as y – r increases. For a prospect theory value function, wtp is non-monotonic 
because of diminishing sensitivity in both positive and negative domains. It is illustrative to 
consider values of wtp for different values of r and y. Table 2 performs this calculation. In 
our numerical examples throughout this paper, we employ the S-shaped power form: v(x) = 
x
β, x ≥ 0, and v(x) = –λ|x|
β, x < 0. We set the exponent to β = 0.5, and loss aversion 
parameter, λ = 2.25. 
Table 2 
Willingness to Pay (= [v(y + 1– r) – v(y)] – [v(y – r) – v(y)] for Different Levels of Habituation 
(column) and Satiation (row)   
  
wtp  r=0 0.25  r=0.5  0.75 r=1 1.25 1.5 
y=–1 2.25 1.39 1.16 1.03 0.93 0.86 0.80 
–0.75  2.45 2.25 1.39 1.16 1.03 0.93 0.86 
–0.5 2.30 2.45 2.25 1.39 1.16 1.03 0.93 
–0.25  1.99 2.30 2.45 2.25 1.39 1.16 1.03 
y=0  1  1.99 2.30 2.45 2.25 1.39 1.16 
0.25 0.62  1  1.99 2.30 2.45 2.25 1.39 
0.5  0.52 0.62  1  1.99 2.30 2.45 2.25 
0.75 0.46 0.52 0.62  1  1.99 2.30 2.45 
y=1 0.41 0.46 0.52 0.62  1  1.99 2.30 
1.25 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.52 0.62  1  1.99 
1.5  0.36 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.52 0.62  1  
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In Table 2, observe that for (y – r) ≥ 0, the willingness to pay decreases as (y – r) increases. 
Thus, if satiation is above the reference point, greater satiation leads to a lower willingness to 
pay. Similarly, for (y – r) ≤ –1, the willingness to pay decreases as (y – r) decreases. For –1 < 
(y – r) < 0, the willingness to pay will either have a single peak or will increase monotonically 
as (y – r) decreases. The maximum willingness to pay is in the region where –1 ≤ (y – r) < 0. 
For food, it is easy to see that the desire for consumption, and therefore the wtp, is low when 
one is full. Similarly, in extreme hunger (e.g., fasting for a long period), one loses the desire 
for food. At a modest level of hunger, one most craves for food and has the highest desire to 
consume. Wathieu (2004) gives examples from marketing (e.g., consumer goods) in which the 
highest levels of wtp are observed at moderate habituation levels. 
It is also interesting to observe how willingness to pay changes with time. The simplest 
analysis is to consider a constant consumption scheme xt = 1, t = 1, 2, …T. Figure 3 shows 
the results for four combinations of parameters that correspond to the four models. In the 
DU Model, wtp is constant and is equal to one. In the HA Model studied by Wathieu (2004), 
wtp is increasing. In the SA Model, wtp is decreasing. In the combined HS Model, wtp 
decreases first and then, once it starts increasing, continues to increase. In the early periods, 
habituation level is relatively low and, therefore, increasing satiation lowers wtp. 
Once habituation increases beyond a certain level, wtp also increases. Beginners who are not 
habituated to watching an opera or eating a specialty food (e.g., spicy or raw) are likely to 
pay less for these goods than when they become accustomed to them. 
The highest level of positive experienced utility for a given value function can only be 
produced by the HS Model when y < 0. An interpretation of y < 0 is the accumulation of 
unmet need or craving. A satisfaction of the unmet need creates a high amount of pleasure 
(i.e., experienced utility). For example, assume y = –1 and r = 0. A consumption of x = 1 
produces an experienced utility of v(1) in the HA Model, but a substantially large –v(–1) in 
the HS Model, especially if one further assumes loss aversion (see losses portion of 
Figure 4). Thus, to experience peak utility one must have some deprivation (e.g., a long hike 
in cold weather to appreciate a warm shower). Scitovsky (1976) argues that pleasure results 
from intermittent satisfaction of desires.  
Figure 3 
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α = 0, γ = 0 
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In the HA Model, consumption below the reference point produces a high negative utility. 
For example, if r = 1, then x = 0 will produce a utility of v(–1). In the HS Model, the 
experienced utility may not be as negative if satiation is high. For example, set x = 0 so that 
the experienced utility is v(y – r) – v(y) < 0. If y is large and v is concave for gains, the 
utility reduction due to non-consumption occurs in a flat zone of the value function (see 
gains portion of Figure 4). This corresponds to the reaction “I don't mind skipping tennis 
today, because I have been playing all week''. 
Craving (y < 0) and the subsequent realization of high utility from consumption, or 
occasional abstinence from consumption without significant reduction in utility when the 
satiation level is high, are realistic features of the HS Model. 
5. Optimal Consumption Path 
Suppose that a decision maker wishes to optimally allocate an income (I) over consumption 
periods t = 1, …, T. For simplicity, assume δ = 1 (no discounting), a constant unit price, and 
borrowing and saving at zero percent interest. The decision maker chooses (x1, …, xT) to 
solve the following optimization problem: 
 
 Max  U(x1,…, xT) =  ) ( ) (
1
t t t t
T
t
y v r x y v − − + ∑
=
 (8) 






 ≤ I, 
 
and rt and yt satisfying the updating equations (2) and (3). 
 
Figure 4 
Satisfying Unmet Needs Creates a Large Positive Utility (negative portion). Abstinence 
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The optimal consumption path given by the DU Model (with δ = 1 and α = γ = 0) is 
constant with xt = I|T, t = 1, …, T. In the HA Model (γ = 0), the optimal consumption path 
is increasing for any sufficiently low initial reference point r1 (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue 
and Rabin, 2003, Lemma 1). In the SA Model (α = 0), the optimal path with no discounting 
is U-shaped: constant between period 2 and T– 1, and higher in periods 1 and T (Baucells 
and Sarin, 2006). 
We now show that, under certain conditions on v, the optimal path in the HS Model is 
increasing with the possible exception of the first period. Further, we show that the satiation 
levels as well as the habituation levels are increasing. 
Our key observation is that, given satiation levels y1, y2, …, yT, yT+1, both the consumption 
levels and the habituation levels can be determined using (2) and (3). Indeed, noting that rt+1 
– rt = α(xt–rt) = α(yt+1 /γ – yt) and xt = rt + yt+1 /γ – yt, t = 1, …, T , both rt and xt can be 
directly calculated as follows:  








(yτ+1/γ – yτ), and   (9) 








yτ+1/γ – yτ)   (10) 
As a consequence, the optimization program (8) can be re-formulated as one of choosing 
values (y2, …, yT, yT+1) to find:  











(1 + α(T – t))(yt+1/γ – yt) ≤ I 
 
Here, the budget constraint is obtained by adding (10) across all periods. The first-order 
conditions are: 
 
 v ′(yt /γ) – γv′(yt)  =  λ[(1 – γ)(1 + α(T – t)) + α], t = 2, ..., T, and   (11) 
 v ′(yT+1 /γ) = λ (12) 
 
 If we define v ˆ (y) ≡ γ[v(y/γ) – v(y)], then we can rewrite (FOC) as: 
 
  ' v ˆ (yt ) = λ[(1 – γ)(1 + α(T – t)) + α], t = 2, ..., T (13) 
  
 
The solution is well-behaved if we assume that v ˆ  is strictly increasing and concave. As 
satiation in the HS Model is driven by utility increments, an increasing v ˆ  ensures that the 
marginal utility of consumption is positive for all levels of satiation. Concavity of v ˆ  ensures 
that the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing for all levels of satiation. 
Proposition 3 Let r1 = y1 = 0, and δ =1. If v ˆ  is increasing and concave, then (i) y1 ≤ y2 ≤ … 
≤ yT ≤ yT+1; (ii) if α ≥ γ, then x1 ≤ x2 ≤ … ≤ xT; and (iii) if  ' ' ' v ˆ ≥ 0, then x2 ≤ x3 ≤ … ≤ xT  for 
any α and γ.   
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Proof of Proposition 3. Notice that the right-hand side of (13) is decreasing in t. Hence, if 
' v ˆ is decreasing in y (i.e., v ˆ  is concave), then the solution satisfies y2 ≤ y3 ≤ … ≤ yT. To see 
that yT ≤ yT+1, notice that: 
 v ′(yT /γ) – γv′(yT)  =  λ(1 – γ + α) = λ – γλ(1 – α/γ) 
   =  v′(yT+1 /γ) – γv′(yT+1/γ)(1 – α/γ) 
   ≥  v′(yT+1 /γ) – γv′(yT+1/γ) ≥ v′(yT+1 /γ) – v′(yT+1) 
 
 If α ≥ γ, then xt, t = 1, …, T is necessarily increasing, as:  
  xt+1 – xt  =  α(rt – xt) + (yt+2 /γ – yt+1) – (yt+1 /γ – yt) 
   =  α(yt+1 /γ – yt+1) + (yt+2 /γ – yt+1) – (yt+1 /γ – yt) 
   =  (yt+2 – yt+1)/γ + yt+1(α – γ)/γ + yt(1 – α) ≥ 0 
 
If  ' ' ' v ˆ ≥ 0, then yt+1 – yt ≤ yt+2 – yt+1, t = 2, …T – 1, and 
  xt+1 – xt = (yt+2 – yt+1)/γ – (yt+1 – yt) + α(yt+1γ – yt) ≥ 0 
 
If consumption levels are increasing, then so are the habituation levels.  
5.1. The Case of Power Utility 
We now consider the optimal consumption path for the power utility function. The power 
form of the per-period utility has been widely used because of its mathematical tractability. 
Let v(x) = x
β, with 0 < β < 1. One can check that in this case v ˆ (y) = y
β(γ
1–β – γ) remains 
increasing and concave, with the same power exponent as the original v. In particular,  ' v ˆ (y) 
= β(γ
1–β – γ)/y
1–β  is a hyperbola, and (12) and (13) yield:  
  yt = 









⎛ t , t = 2, …, T, where κt =  [] α α γ
γ γ β
β
+ − + −
−
−




, and  (14) 
  yT+1 = γ









⎛  (15) 
 To find λ, we first re-write the budget constraint as:  
I + (1 + α(T – 1)) y1 – Tr1  =  yT+1/γ + ∑
=









    = 
















)) ( 1 )( 1 (
γ
α α γ











For tractability, assume that both the initial habituation and satiation levels are a fraction of 
the total consumption budget (i.e., r1 = ηI and y1 = θI, 0 ≤η, θ, < 1). Of course, this includes, 
as a special case, r1 = y1 = 0. Under this assumption, it follows that 1/λ
1/(1–β) is inversely 
proportional to I, as:  
  λ
1/(1–β) =   []
) )) 1 ( 1 ( 1 (
/ )) ( 1 )( 1 (
2
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 /( 1
η θ α






− − + +
+ − + − +∑ =
− −
 (16)  
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Replacing (16) into (14) and (15) shows that the satiation levels are all proportional to I. 
But replacing the satiation levels in (9) and (10), together with r1 and y1, yields that rt+1 and xt, 
t = 1, …, T, are also proportional to the budget. 
For a given budget or income (I,) the optimal consumption planning problem discussed 
above provides the associated maximum total utility, U(I) = U(
*
1 x , …, 
*
T x ) , where 
*
t x , are 
optimal consumption levels. By varying I, one can repeatedly solve the planning problem 
and obtain the indirect utility of income. In the power case, experienced utility in each 
period is proportional to I
β, as is the indirect utility of income. 
6. Projection Bias    
In our HS Model, one must accurately forecast the impact of current consumption on the 
future reference point and the future satiation level to predict future experienced utility. 
There is considerable evidence in Loewenstein, Read, and Baumeister (2003) that people 
underestimate both adaptation and satiation. With a rising income, the reference point may 
shift upwards faster than predicted. Similarly, people buy too much when hungry or buy a 
three-day pass for museums and fail to account for the increasing levels of satiation. 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) provide evidence that, while people 
qualitatively understand that they will become adapted or satiated, they underestimate the 
magnitude of these changes. They project that future preferences will be more similar to 
current preferences. The bias is therefore known as projection bias. 
Figure 5  
Predicted and Actual Utility of Constant Consumption of One Unit Above Initial Reference 
Point (diamonds) and One Unit Below Initial Reference Point (squares) [α = γ = 0.2,π = 0.5] 
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We first consider the simple cases of constant consumption of one unit above the initial 
reference point and of constant consumption of one unit below the initial reference point. 
We assume that the predicted reference and satiation levels are halfway between the current 
and actual levels. Figure 5 shows that under both cases, the experienced utility converges to 
the neutral level. People adapt to both positive and negative outcomes. Under projection 
bias, however, people predict higher levels of experienced utility for the desirable case and 
lower levels of experienced utility for the undesirable case. The impact of good fortune or 
misfortune is predicted to be more severe than it actually turns out to be (Brickman, Coates, 
and Janoff-Bullman, 1978). 
6.1. Buying on an Empty Stomach 
It has been well documented that shoppers who are hungry over-buy food (Nisbett and 
Kanouse, 1968). Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003) argue that one reason for this 
sub-optimal behavior is projection bias, as the consumer projects the hungry state into the 
future. In our model, such a behavior is easily explained as the anticipated satiation level 
when hungry (y ≤ 0) is lower than what it will turn out to be. In Table 3, it is shown that the 
purchase amount increases with the level of projection bias. The projection parameter, π, 
indicates that the predicted satiation level is π * current level + (1 – π) * actual level. 
This table is constructed by modeling a shopper that, at the beginning of period 1, makes a 
purchasing decision for a 10-day period. The good under consideration has a satiation 
retention factor of γ
1 = 0.2. The consumer is supposed to decide how to divide the budget 
between this and another good, thus spending a total budget of I = 100. The other good does 
not exhibit satiation. When π = 0, there is no projection bias and the rational model predicts a 
lower purchase of the good that satiates (approximately 25% of good 1 and 75% of good 2). 
The higher the projection bias, the more of the satiating good one consumes. In the extreme, 
when π = 1, the consumer fully projects the initial satiation level y1 = 0 into the future and, 
hence, ignores satiation entirely. Therefore, the consumer splits equally the budget between 
the two goods. 
Table 3 
The Effect of Projection Bias on Total Advanced Purchasing of a Satiation Good (X1) and a 
Non-Satiation Good (X2), and Effect on Actual and Predicted Utility [α
1 = 0.1, γ
1 = 0.2; 
α
2  = γ
2 = 0; w = 1/2] 
π      X1           X2       Actual Utility  Predicted Utility 
0 25  75  18.2  18.2 
0.25 29  71  18.2  18.7 
0.5 33  67  18.1  19.3 
0.75 39  61  17.7  20.2 
1 50  50  17.0  22.4 
 
 
Inducing over-purchase when consumers have a low current level of satiation has been used 
as a marketing tool. For instance, at the beginning of the ski season, when people are 
“hungry'' for skiing, people predict that they may go skiing more often than they actually 
will. Hence, they may find an offer of 10 ski passes attractive. As the season unfolds and the 
satiation level for skiing increases, the consumer may end up not taking advantage of  
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the package. Similarly, consumer may over-purchase vacation days on cruise ships or beach 
vacations, as one does not anticipate correctly the satiation associated with staying in the 
same place for several days. 
7. Peak Utility 
In some cases, the focus may be on peak utility rather than total utility. Varey and 
Kahneman (1992) show that in retrospective evaluation (e.g., how good a vacation was) the 
peak and end experiences play a dominant role. Hence, the decision maker may want to 
maximize the peak utility of such an extended experience. Consider the problem of 
determining an optimal consumption plan that maximizes peak utility subject to the budget 
constraint:  
Max(x1,…,xT)    Maxt {v(yt + xt – rt) –v(yt)} 







and rt and yt satisfy the updating equations (2) and (3). 
In the DU, HA, and SA models, peak utility is maximized by consuming I in the last period. In 
the HS Model, however, consumption of a small amount in an early period increases the 
reference point; a few periods of no consumption then creates craving (y < 0), and, finally, a 
large consumption in the final period gives the peak utility. In our example with I =100, α= 0.3, 
and  γ = 0.5, the peak utility is maximized by consuming 74 units in the final period, and 
consuming 26 units 5 periods before. In the remaining periods, consumption is zero. The 
realized peak utility is 12 compared to 10 if all 100 units are consumed in the last period. 
Promotional tools, such as a brief stay in a luxury resort, are designed to create desire. 
Maximization of peak utility may not be rational in prospective planning. Kahneman, Wakker 
and Sarin (1997) distinguish between the desired goal of maximizing total utility and 
retrospective evaluation for which peak utility plays a major part. Our model suggests that 
voluntary abstinence, which creates heightened need, produces the peak experienced utility 
from subsequent consumption. For example, an outing to celebrate an anniversary is made 
more enjoyable if one follows a simple and routine life for a few days before the big event. 
8. Discrete Choice Problem 
In this section we consider a problem in which a consumer chooses one of two goods in 
each time period. The good quantity cannot be modulated and is set to one. An example of 
such a choice is having Indian food or American food for dinner on a given evening. If both 
goods are DU goods (i.e., produce no habituation and no satiation), then the choice problem 
is trivial. As utility does not change from one period to the next, it is optimal to choose the 
same good each period. Under satiation and habituation, however, the choice of a good now 
impacts its future experienced utility and, therefore, future choice. A rational consumer will 
choose a sequence that maximizes total utility. Assume that experienced utility in each 
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Essentially, there are 2
T possible sequences and the consumer chooses the sequence that 
produces the highest sum of experienced utility over T periods. To gain insight, we use an 
example in which T = 10 and the second good is assumed to be a DU good with α
b = γ
 b = 0. 
In Table 4, we show the optimal sequence for the HA, SA, and HS models. In Table 4, 
A and B denote (
a
t x  = 1, 
b
t x = 0) and (
a
t x  = 0, 
b
t x = 1), respectively. 
For the HA Model, the optimal sequence has the increasing path property; that is, if it is 
optimal to consume A in period s, then it is optimal to continue consuming A in periods t > s. 
Hence, a consumer may consume A throughout, or begin with B and switch to A permanently 
at some intermediate period. A segment of Starbucks coffee consumers exhibit this loyalty. 
Tabla 4 
Optimal Discrete Choice between A and B [w = 2/3; α
b = γ
b = 0] 
    HA Model  SA Model  HS Model 
    α
a = 0.05  α
a = 0  α
a = 0.05 
Period  γ
a  = 0  γ
a  = 0.2  γ
a  = 0.2 
1 A  A  A 
2 A  B  B 
3 A  A  A 
4 A  B  B 
5 A  A  A 
6 A  B  B 
7 A  A  A 
8 A  B  A 
9 A  A  A 
10 A  A  A 
 
For the SA Model, one observes variety-seeking behavior. The consumer switches from A to 
B and back to A at regular intervals. The consumption of B takes as many periods as 
necessary to bring the satiation level of A below some threshold, after which consuming A is 
again optimal. Clearly, the SA Model also permits the trivial case when consuming only one 
of the two goods is optimal all the time. 
For the HS Model, both habituation and satiation effects are involved. Thus, the optimal 
consumption path is more complex. The consumer may start by switching often between A 
and B due to variety seeking behavior induced by satiation of A. As the consumer develops 
habituation for A, he will choose B infrequently as time passes. At some point, the consumer 
may decide to permanently switch to A. An example may be switching between playing golf 
and tennis, playing golf with increasing frequency until ultimately switching solely to  
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golf. More broadly, casual observation indicates that young people seek variety in their 
activities, whereas older people tend to settle on a few, very established habits. 
The optimal plan in any of the HA, SA, or HS models depends on the parameters α and γ. It 
is important to note, however, that the pattern of variety seeking in early periods, less 
frequent switching in intermediate periods, and finally a permanent switch to one of the 
goods is consistent only with the HS Model. Thus, the HS Model does not simply include 
the HA, SA, and DU models as special cases; it permits a richer behavior than none of the 
other three models permits under any set of parameter values. 
There is, however, a delicate balance between seeking variety and starting a new habit. For 
goods with low habituation (small α), variety mitigates the effects of satiation. But highly 
habituating goods induce negative utility when not consumed. The total utility may 
therefore be maximized by deliberately choosing only a few habituating goods. Parents 
usually try to keep children from acquiring time-consuming or expensive habits. 
In an example with three symmetric goods, each with α = 0.05 and γ = 0.2, and equally 
weighted additive separable utilities, we find that the optimal sequence is to pick any two of 
these three goods and to exclude the third, and then to alternate consumption between the two 
chosen goods. Thus, (A, B, A, B,…) or (A, C, A, C,…) are both optimal sequences. Therefore, 
starting with homogenous preferences for a population, one may observe heterogeneous 
outcomes, e.g., people choosing and liking different consumption goods based on some 
arbitrary initial selection. Examples include type of cuisine, favorite sport team, and hobbies. 
In the above example, if α is set to 0.01 or less, then the optimal sequence, (A, B, C, A, B, 
C,…), alternates between the three goods. Thus, when habituation is low and satiation is 
high, more variety is indeed better. At the other extreme, if α is equal to 0.1 or more, then 
there are three equivalent optimal sequences, which consist of picking the same good in 
each period, say (B, B, B,…), which avoids initiating a habit in the other two goods. 
9. Narrow Bracketing 
Optimal planning over the entire horizon (T) requires considerable cognitive effort as there are 
significant interactions across periods. People often use local optimization rather than global 
optimization to simplify the choice process. In a traveling salesman problem, for example, a 
heuristic to visit the closest unvisited city reduces the computational burden involved in 
a global optimization. Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin (1999) provide evidence that people 
often narrowly bracket the choices and thus focus on the local consequences of their choices. 
Herrnstein and Prelec (1992) argue that people ignore or under-appreciate interactions across 
periods. In our example, one form of narrow bracketing is simply to sequentially choose the 
highest utility alternative A or B in each period. In each period, one observes yt and rt (updated 
satiation and reference levels) and chooses the alternative (A or B) that yields the highest 
utility in that period alone. 
In Table 5, an example illustrates that under narrow bracketing A is preferred to B in each of 
the ten periods. In this example, the utility of A is decreasing over time, but is still greater than 
the utility of B in each period. Without narrow bracketing, the optimal choice considers all ten 
periods together; in period 2, B is chosen despite its lower utility (0.29 versus 0.42). This is 
because the utility of A in period 3 jumps to 0.54, instead of 0.39 had locally optimal A been 
chosen in period 2, illustrating that the optimal choice takes into account the impact of earlier  
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choices on the utilities associated with later choices. To some degree, consumers do recognize 
such internalities: “let's eat a light lunch since we are going to a fancy restaurant for dinner.'' 
In many situations, however, choices are presented and made separately in each period and 
consumers may not take a holistic perspective. Simonson (1990) and Simonson and Winer 
(1992) have found that in a sequential choice condition, people tend to choose the same item 
in each period. For a simultaneous choice condition, people use a broad perspective and favor 
variety. For a simultaneous choice, the interactions are made more transparent (e.g., reservations 
in advance at restaurants for each day of the three days of a vacation) and, therefore, a consumer 
is more likely to take into account these interactions. For a sequential choice (e.g., making a 
reservation at a restaurant for just the same day), one does account for adaptation and satiation 
from past consumption, but may fail to see the impact of current choice on future utility. 
Narrow bracket choices can sometimes be substantially inferior to the globally optimal choice. 
A middle ground, however, is to use a heuristic or a decision rule (tennis on Wednesday 
evening and golf on Saturday, go to a party only on one weekend evening, limit TV watching 
during weekdays) that to some degree takes into account preference interactions across 
periods. In Table 5, a heuristic of alternating between A and B gives a reasonable solution. 
Both habituation and satiation impact future experienced utility. A rational person will 
properly account for these interactions and choose the sequence of consumptions that 
maximizes global utility. Narrow bracketing may, however, lead to over-consumption of 
addictive goods as their deleterious long-run effects may not be apparent on a daily basis 
until it is too late. Similarly, one may over-consume attractive, but highly satiating, goods 
(Herrnstein and Prelec, 1992). 
Table 5 
Narrow Bracket and Optimal Choice [α = 0.05; γ = 0.2; w = 2/3] 
    Narrow Bracket  Broad Bracket  Broad Bracket 
Period  Sub-Optimal Choice  Optimal Choice  Heuristic Choice 
1  A [0.67]  A [0.67]  A [0.67] 
2  A [0.42]  B [0.29]  B [0.29] 
3  A [0.39]  A [0.54]  A [0.54] 
4  A [0.38]  B [0.25]  B [0.25] 
5  A [0.37]  A [0.55]  A [0.55] 
6  A [0.36]  B [0.19]  B [0.19] 
7  A [0.35]  A [0.56]  A [0.56] 
8  A [0.34]  A [0.39]  B [0.09] 
9  A [0.33]  A [0.36]  A [0.59] 
10  A [0.32]  A [0.35]  A [0.38] 
Total Utility  [3.91]  [4.16]  [4.12] 
Rank 88
th best  1
st best  4
th best 
10. Discrete Choice with Variable Quantity 
We now consider the problem of allocating a budget (I) to two goods, A and B, over T 
periods. In each period, only one of the two goods can be consumed, either A or B. 
Essentially, this is the same as the discrete choice problem, but now both the type of good 
and its consumption quantity are optimally determined.  
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b, as in (17). In Table 6, the results 
of a numerical example are presented. In this example, goods A and B are symmetric in the 
sense that both have the same parameters of habituation and satiation, and w = 1/2. We 
observe that, because of habituation, the budget allocated is increasing over time; but because 
of satiation, consumption is alternating between Good A and Good B. An example of such a 
pattern may be that an individual's budget for meals increases over time, but the individual 
may alternate between the type of food or restaurant. This is consistent with the observation of 
Lyubomirsky, Sheldon, and Schkade (2005) that the pernicious effects of habituation can be 
attenuated by attending to the timing and variety of consumption. Scitovsky (1976) similarly 
argues that pleasure can be enhanced through novelty and variety. 
Table 6 
Optimal Consumption Path in a Discrete Choice with Variable Quantity [α
a = α
b = 0.05; γ
a = 
γ
b = 0.2; w = 1/2] 
Period  Choice  Quantity A  Quantity B  Budget Allocation 
1 B  -  3.84 3.84 
2 A 4.80  - 4.80 
3 B  -  5.27 5.27 
4 A 6.48  - 6.48 
5 B  -  7.20 7.20 
6 A 9.52  - 9.52 
7 B  -  10.70  10.70 
8 A  13.50  -  13.50 
9 B  -  19.30  19.30 
10 A  19.30  -  19.30 
11. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have proposed a model that incorporates both habituation and satiation into 
evaluating time streams of consumption. Present consumption creates satiation, but also 
contributes to habit formation, thereby influencing the utility of future consumption. In our 
model, habituation is influenced by a parameter (α) and satiation by a parameter (γ); thus, 
the evaluation of a consumption stream and the optimal consumption plan depends on the 
relative values of α and γ. 
The speed of adaptation (α) could be sign-dependent. For certain goods, one could imagine 
having  α
+ > α
–  (i.e., habituation levels adapt to current consumption faster when 
consumption exceeds the reference level and diminish slowly when consumption is below 
the habituation level). Similarly, γ could be different, as satiation increases at a faster rate 
with consumption than the rate at which it diminishes with no consumption.  
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A prediction of our model in discrete choice situations is that a consumer will seek variety 
in the early periods to mitigate the effects of satiation, but will gradually shift consumption 
towards highly habituating goods. A rational consumer will limit the amount of habit-
forming goods consumed by not initiating consumption of some goods. Consumers may 
start with identical preferences, but because of some arbitrary initial choice may gravitate 
towards different choices. For example, people initially may choose a sport activity such as 
golf, tennis, or running on some social or circumstantial basis, but then become habituated 
and continue to indulge in the same sport. 
Perhaps the more important insights from our model are obtained when certain biases 
prevent consumers from properly accounting for the effects of current consumption on 
future utility. We consider narrow choice bracketing and projection bias and study how 
these biases impact the chosen consumption plan. These biases produce a gap between 
predicted and actual, realized utility. 
In narrow choice bracketing, a consumer considers one period at a time and uses the optimal 
allocation for that period alone. This myopic optimization produces significantly inferior 
results if the interaction across periods through habituation and satiation is significant. It may, 
for example, lead to choosing the same good in each period even though a varied choice, 
though locally less preferred, may maximize total utility in the broad bracket evaluation. 
A person with projection bias believes that the future will be similar to the present (i.e., the 
current reference point and satiation level will change more slowly than they actually do). 
Such a person will predict high experienced utility for constant consumption over the initial 
reference point, but will actually realize a lower experienced utility. Thus, one thinks that 
more money will buy more happiness when in fact it does not (Baucells and Sarin, 2007). 
One, however, need not accept the neutral utility as unavoidable. A greater allocation to 
basic goods and a careful selection of few habit-forming goods may improve experienced 
utility. A person may become adapted to a fancy car or staying in nice hotels, but always 
enjoys a nice meal and conversations with friends. 
We suggest a few directions for future research. The first is to examine the implications of 
our model in the context of time horizon uncertainty. It is likely that the optimal 
consumption path will not be as increasing as we have obtained. Second, it will be 
interesting to explore the full implications of our model to well-being and happiness 
research. We have provided here only the most transparent result under projection bias. 
Third, an axiomatic study of our model is worth exploring. Finally, through effort, one may 
reduce projection bias or moderate adaptation speed; a comprehensive model of time 
allocation and consumption path determination may provide further insights into how 
people may counter the pernicious effects of habituation and satiation. 
While the habituation-satiation model we propose is more complex than the DU or the HA 
models, we have shown that the added flexibility it brings, is needed to account for well-
documented preferences and behaviors. Heaton (1995, p. 681) finds “evidence for a 
preference structure in which consumption at nearby dates is substitutable and where habit 
over consumption develops slowly.” Our model shows that sophisticated patterns of variety 
seeking, selective habituation, and increasing consumption path are consistent with the 
rational choice of a consumer who experiences habituation and satiation. 
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